Beyond the Cusp

January 7, 2014

Iran Will Soon Produce Deployable Nuclear Weapons

In the two months between the announced and much touted framework of an interim agreement reached between the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council) plus Germany, also known as the P5+1, and Iran there has been a number of revealing comments and strategies displayed. The most overlooked but probably of vital importance was that the agreement which was proclaimed to be such a great victory of diplomacy took another three weeks of negotiations before a date of implementation was able to be announced. That date is January 20, 2014, a mere three weeks after the date originally announced by the Obama Administration as the target date agreed to back in November of last year. This was merely one last reminder of what the Iranian goal has been since day one, delay, delay, delay. What was additionally interesting was that after the greatest diplomatic victory ever accomplished without resorting to the use of weapons was not even actually a deal but rather some guidelines necessarily needing fleshing out and further negotiations defining the original vague and broad statements which were otherwise quite meaningless.

 

This fact should give any observer a clue about the entirety of the negotiations, near agreements, bellicose accusations, angry rebuttals, and virtually every other form of diplomatic posturing that can be laughingly called serious negotiations, namely that Iran won the time and the release of funding along with sanctions relief just in time to cover the investments necessary to actually produce a nuclear weapon. Up to this point much of the efforts were in two main areas, first making sufficient enriched Uranium which could be rapidly refined to weapons grade enrichment of 90% and the theoretical research and development of the actual structures and components necessary to build the actual nuclear device. All the Iranians required to accomplish these goals were thousands of centrifuges, sufficient raw Uranium ore or Yellow Cake which is required to produce uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) to feed the centrifuges and scientists with computers and time to develop the actual research into manufacturing the actual weapon. The Iranians have Uranium mines within their borders, produced thousands of centrifuges slowly and steadily over time, procured sufficient Yellow Cake also over time, and had the scientists to design the actual weapon. The one common denominator the Iranians required from the negotiations was time, and that they accomplished.

 

Now the Iranians are entering the final stages for becoming a nuclear armed state, the actual production of the actual weapons. This stage requires far less time than the previous stages but does require far more revenues to attain the needed items and raw materials other than the enriched Uranium and the machinery necessary to produce the components to accuracies which are extremely defined and specific. This was the impetus behind the so-called Iranian change in attitude and willingness to negotiate far more honestly and seriously than previously. The Iranians knew they were going to be required to at least promise to abide by restrictions in order to achieve the release of much of their frozen funds as well as the lifting of particular sanctions in order to procure the rest of the materials required for their final push to nuclear weapons status. This is exactly what the agreement in Geneva accomplished after not simply years but decades of contentious adversarial diplomatic wrangling and debate where Iran had been stalling for time. Negotiating for time requires intransigence, rigid stances, accusations, demands for specific definitions, intricacies and any other stalling method that draws out the period that the negotiations continue. One of the Iranian’s favorite ploys was to feign complicity only to make demands for relief from sanctions which were known to be unacceptable blowing apart any progress at the final instances when a deal appeared imminent. This allowed the Western leaders to tout the new, serious and agreeable turn in the Iranian position only to detour the final stage of negotiations into a dead end and then showing a pique of anger walking out necessitating a complete restart from square one in the negotiations when they were resumed. Now the Iranians have turned a corner in the negotiations where they no longer were negotiating for time and have now negotiated for relief from sanctions and monetary relief as these are the required elements for Iran to make their final push to produce nuclear weapons, and that is exactly what President Obama arranged to happen with this latest agreement.

 

During this past week, Iranian lawmaker, cleric, and member of the Majilis (one of the ruling councils) Mohammed Nabavian declared that Iran does need a nuclear bomb in order to destroy Israel. He further related that Iran would need but “two weeks” if it gets “access to 270 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium. This was one of the Red Lines put in place by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu as something Israel could not let pass and simply ignore. According to Iranian media Nabavian had stated, “We are not looking for a nuclear bomb, but having a nuclear bomb is necessary to put down Israel.” He then went on to explain how the Iranian leadership had maneuvered President Obama and the Western leaders to a point where they needed Iran more than Iran did them. He used the chasing and calling to beg for an audience with newly elected Iranian President Rouhani by United States President Obama in New York during the opening ceremonies for the United Nations General Assembly to illustrate Obama’s apparent weakness as compared to Iranian strength. After everything he said, the one statement which should stand out was the admission that Iran would require a nuclear weapon in order to destroy Israel. That is tantamount to a declaration of intent to develop nuclear weapons by Iran and should be seen as such. Iran will have attained nuclear weapons status before the six months runs out on the interim agreement. Even should they run into any unsuspected problems, the agreement is written to include a provision which allows for it to be renewed by the two parties should they agree. Renewing the agreement for another six months would probably take less time than would the introductions of the members of the individual delegations attending the meetings to formalize such an extension. This little stated fact provides the real intent of the interim agreement, namely to allow Iran the financial, economic and procurement latitude freed from certain sanctions to produce their nuclear arsenal without any further Western interference. That is why it is highly likely that Iran will have produced at least three to eight deliverable nuclear devices within the six month time period of the agreement and will simply continue to extend the agreement in six month chunks for as long as allowed to get away with that ploy or until the Western nations capitulate completely and free Iran from any restraints in the name of cooperation and peace for our times. Why does that phrase sound so eerily familiar?

 

Beyond the Cusp


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